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DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL:
A MODEL IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
In response to the growing concern over the drunken driver, during
the past decade many states have enacted implied consent statutes.'
These laws provide that a motorist, by the act of driving, has impliedly
consented to a chemical test for determining the alcoholic content of
his blood. Properly drafted, an implied consent statute can be a state's
most effective weapon in curbing drunken driving.
Unfortunately, the states have drafted their individual statutes with
little view to uniformity. Consequently, each state statute has its own
peculiar weaknesses and omissions. The purpose of this note is to com-
pare these statutes, examining the major problems and differences, and
thereby to propose a model statute which remedies these problems. Par-
ticular emphasis is placed upon the statutory language necessary to
deal more effectively with the problem of the drunken driver. Less
space is devoted to those provisions which have been uniformly adopted
by the states, while the more controversial or varied provisions have
been emphasized.
The model statute has been fragmented so that each section may be
considered separately. No attempt has been made to introduce new
provisions in this field; rather, the model statute simply identifies and
1. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 154 (Supp. 1969); ALAsKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (1970); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (Supp. 1969-70); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1969); CAL.
VEHILE CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1971); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-30 (1964); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (1968); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 68-1625.1 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 286-151 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-
352 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 144 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 47-2003c (Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-1001 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.565 (1968); LA. REv. STAT. § 32:661 (Supp.
1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90,
§ 24 (1969); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.625a (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN.
S 169.123 (Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp. 1970); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-
727.03 (1960); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69-a (1966); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2
(Supp. 1970); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.4 (Supp. 1969); N. Y. VEI. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1194 (1970); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Repl. Vol. 1965); N. D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-20-01 (Supp. 1969); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1970); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.634 (1965); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (Supp. 1970); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (1969); S. C. CODE
ANN. § 46-344 (Supp. 1970); S. D. COMPILED LAWS § 32-23-10 (1969); TEX. PEN. CODE
art. 802f (Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,




consolidates the best features from the implied consent statutes of the
various states.
PURPOSE OF AN IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
The drunken driver has been the greatest danger on our nation's
highways in recent years. The immediate concern of the police in deal-
ing with this problem is securing the maximum number of criminal
convictions of offenders. In order to accomplish this end, it is necessary
to provide a reliable means of obtaining evidence of the motorist's con-
dition at the time of the alleged violation. Chemical evidence, based
on presumptions and implemented by an implied consent statute, has
been demonstrated to effectively accomplish this objective. This effec-
tiveness is largely due to the objective nature of this type evidence as
contrasted with the personal observation formerly used. With evidence
based only upon personal observations, prosecutors were consistently
confronted by the vagaries of conflicting attitudes toward the drinking
driver.2 By increasing the probability of conviction, an implied consent
statute effectively deters the public from driving after drinking. Suc-
cess in achieving this deterrent effect is the standard against which the
effectiveness of any implied consent statute must be measured.
MODEL STATUTE PROVISIONS
3
§ 100. Implied consent to a chemical test.
Any person who operates a motor vehicle within this state is
deemed to have consented to a chemical test of his breath, urine,
saliva or blood in order to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood.
The statutes which make the conduct of driving under the influence
of alcoholic beverages criminal usually apply everywhere within the
state.4 However, many states have limited the application of their
2. The objectivity of the chemical evidence is very important. In the past prosecutors
faced a heavy burden in relying on subjective observations since there are over sixty
pathological conditions which produce symptoms similar to intoxication. Smith, Implied
Consent Legislation and the Virginia Experience, 38 U. VA. NEws Lwrr 37 (1962).
3. Due to the length and complexity of the model statute it will be presented in
piecemeal sections, each section followed by textual comment. The comments will ex-
plain the provisions of the statute while alluding to provisions of the implied consent
statutes of various states.
4. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 2 (1936) (any highway of this state); HAwAi REv. STAT.
§ 291-4 (1949) (applies to whoever operates or assumes actual physical control of the
operation of any vehicle).
19711
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
implied consent statutes to persons operating motor vehicles on a public
highway. Since the purpose of an implied consent statute is to facilitate
the prosecution of drunken drivers, and the obtaining of convictions
for driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, the two
statutes should be coextensive. Therefore, the suggested model statute
encompasses every motorist, licensed or unlicensed, resident or non-
resident, who operates a motor vehicle within the state.
This provision is also the implied consent portion of the statute. Al-
though there has been considerable discussion concerning the theory
upon which a state may impose this implied consent, the constitutionality
of such statutes seems well established.6 Undeniably the state has an
overwhelming interest in the safety of its highways. A reasonable exer-
cise of the state's police power to safeguard this interest is sufficient jus-
tification for limiting the individual's liberty.
The model statute provides four different chemical tests to determine
the alcoholic content of the suspected individual's blood.7 This provi-
sion has been incorporated into many of the existing state statutes. 8
5. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 154 (Supp. 1969) ("the public highways"); HAWAI REV.
STAT. § 286-151 (1968) ("public highways"); UNIFORRM VEHICLE CODE § 6-205. But see
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANt. § 14-227b (Supp. 1970) ("in the state"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.261 (1968) ("within the state"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-352 (1967) ("in the state");
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.565 (1968) ("in the state"); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 257.625a (Supp. 1970) ("within the state"); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1970)
("any public roads, street or highway or quasi-public area").
6. One theory suggests that the constitutional basis for implied consent statutes is
the "right-privilege theory" under which the use of the state's highways for the purpose
of operating a motor vehicle is considered a privilege rather than a right. It follows
that the state may impose conditions on the exercise of that privilege. See Comment,
Constitutionality of Cow'pulsory Chemical Tests to Detemnine Alcoholic Intoxication,
40 I.L. L. REv. 245, 257 (1945); Note, Chenical Tests for Intoxication: A Legal, Medical
and Constitutional Survey, 37 N.D. L. REv. 212, 252 (1961); 51 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1200
(1953); 17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 299, 300 (1960).
Another theory involves a due process analysis. Starting with a recognition of the
economic and social importance of the automobile in today's society, this theory asserts
that the freedom to use one's automobile "is a 'liberty' which under the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without due process of law." Wall
v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953). See Comment,
Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Content, 40
ILL. L. REv. 245, 259-62 (1945); Comment, Admissibility and Constitutionality of Chen-
ical Intoxication Tests, 35 TEXAs L. REv. 813, 830 (1957).
7. For a thorough examination and explanation of the various tests used to measure
the alcoholic content of a person's blood see Watts, Some Observations on Police-
Administered Tests for Intoxication, 45 N.C. L. REv. 34 (1966).
8. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-352 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1964).
[Vol. 12:654
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While the statutes in force in most states provide at least one alternative
test,9 at least one state provides only for a blood test ° Although the
latter provision eliminates confusion as to who decides which test is to
be given, this problem is easily solved by effective statutory draftsman-
ship, without sacrificing alternative tests.1 Moreover, modem science
is capable of accurately extrapolating the results of other chemical tests
to determine the alcoholic content of the subject's blood at an earlier
time. The reliability of evidence based upon chemical tests of the
breath, urine and saliva is well established. 2 Since these tests do not
involve an entry into the body, they are generally less offensive to the
person being tested. Alternative tests are provided in order to allow
maximum flexibility to the police and to provide a means for obtaining
evidence based upon chemical tests from persons who have valid medical
reasons for refusing to submit to a blood test.
(a) Grounds for administering the tests.
The test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest for any offense
committed while operating a motor vehicle and shall be adminis-
tered at the direction of a law enforcement official when such of-
ficial has reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person was
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages.
Two basic requirements must be met before the law enforcement
official may imply the motorist's consent to a chemical test: (1) a law-
ful arrest for any offense committed while operating a motor vehicle,
and (2) reasonable grounds to believe the motorist was operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. New
York's original implied consent law'" was declared invalid as violative
of due process because the statute did not provide that the test was to
9. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-727.03 (1969) (breath or urine); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6-44.10 (1970) (breath or urine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1188 (1967) (breath or urine);
UNIFORM VEMCLE CODE 5 11-902 (b) (breath or urine).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55(b) (Supp. 1970). See also Mo. STAT. ANN. § 564.441
(Supp. 1965) (breath); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1966) (breath); S.C. CODE
ANN. 46-344(a) (Supp. 1969) (breath).
11. UNIFORM Vasucr= CoDE § 6-205. This section provides for the decision as to
which test is to be administered to be made by the law enforcement agency which
employs the arresting officer.
12. See Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practice and Legal Problems of
Chemical Testing, 44 MnN. L. REv. 673 (1960).
13. Ch. 854, [1953] N. Y Sess. Laws (now N.Y. VEH. & TrA. LAw § 1194 (1970)).
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
be made only after arrest upon reasonable grounds.14 The states now
uniformly conform to this requirement by including both of these re-
quirements as part of their implied consent legislation.
(b) Choice of test to be administered.
The law enforcement official shall designate which of the tests
shall be administered. However, the motorist will have the option
to demand that only a breath test be administered.
Many states have encountered difficulty by failing to designate the
party who decides which test is to be given.' 5 The model statute clearly
empowers the law enforcement official to make this decision. If this
choice were left to the motorist he might frustrate the purpose of the
statute by demanding a test for which the local law enforcement agency
lacked sufficient facilities. Furthermore, a statute which required all
local law enforcement agencies to maintain the capability to administer
all four chemical tests would place an unreasonable economic burden
upon the state. This model statute provision, in conformity with many
of the more recent implied consent statutes, 16 permits the law enforce-
ment official to designate a chemical test which he knows can be prop-
erly administered in his jurisdiction. By enacting a provision such as
this, the state legislatures foreclose judicial challenge to the law enforce-
ment official's authority to designate the test to be given and provide
clear guidelines for law enforcement agencies.
The model statute attempts to balance the interests and rights of the
individual with the compelling public interest implemented by the
statute. This balance is partially achieved by providing the motorist
with an option to demand that only a chemical test of his breath be
14. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
15. This difficulty arises when the statute reads "the test . . . shall be administered
at the direction of a law enforcement official." E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1625.1 (Supp.
1970). In Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961) and Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d
359 (N.D. 1961) the courts held that similar language gave the choice of tests to the
law enforcement official. But see Bean v. State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P.2d 750 (1961), and
Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 942 (1959), where a Utah court dismissed
two convictions under the statute because the defendants had not been given a choice
of tests. This points out the need for a clear determination by a statute as to who will
have the choice of which test is to be administered.
16. E.g., Oino REv. CODE ANN. S 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1970). But see ME. REv.




performed. This provision 17 removes some of the burden placed on
the individual since the test is probably the least offensive of the chem-
ical tests currently available. 8 Although under this provision all local
law enforcement agencies must be equipped to administer the breath
test, it is probably the least expensive and the most easily administered
test available.' 9
(c) Notification to motorist of rights; result of refusal
Prior to the administration of any chemical test, the motorist
shall be advised of his option to demand that only a breath test be
administered. In addition he shall be informed of his right to re-
fuse to submit to any chemical test and that such refusal shall re-
sult in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle
'within this state for a period of one year.
As previously discussed, an implied consent statute is essentially con-
cerned with getting the drunken driver off the road. However, in adopt-
ing measures to accomplish this goal, the interests of the individual must
also be considered. This necessitates balancing individual rights against
the need for evidence at trial in the form of chemical test results. In
attempting to maintain a balance, it is fundamental that a law enforce-
ment official be required to inform the accused motorist of his rights
and privileges. The motorist must be informed of his option of tests,
or there would be, in fact, no option presented. He must be informed
of his right to refuse to submit to any chemical test, or undoubtedly he
usually will submit because of the manifestation of police authority.
Further, he must be informed of the consequences of his refusal in
order to make an intelligent decision whether or not to submit. Many
states have failed to provide these fundamental yet minimum standards
of notice in their implied consent statutes.20 Especially in light of the
17. This provision is patterned after Micfr. Coma,. LAws. Aizw. § 257.625a(6) (Supp.
1970).
18. Michigan has chosen the breathalyzer as the device to be used in all breath tests.
Georgia has chosen the intoximeter. For information as to the relative accuracy and
simplicity of these and other devices for testing the breath see Slough & Wilson, supra
note 12, at 678-80; Watts, supra note 7, at 56-58, 64-68.
19. For an interesting probe into the implementation of a state-wide breath testing
program in Michigan see Dimond, A Reappraisal of Implied Consent and the Drinking
Driver, 3 PRosPEcrus 139, 159-61 (1969).
20. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (1969) (motorist given the option to object to a
blood test but no provision for notice of this right to be given; nor provision for notice
of the right of refusal or of the consequences of refusal); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § l189
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failure of the courts of most jurisdictions to require that individuals in
police custody be fully informed of their rights, the legislatures should
provide for this aspect of the problem within the implied consent
statute.2
(d) Test not to be administered by the arresting officer.
The chemical test given to the motorist for the purpose of de-
termining the alcoholic content of his blood shall not be admin-
istered by the arresting la'w enforcement official.
The model statute provides that the test is to be "... administered
at the direction of a law enforcement official...." Under this provision,
the arresting officer normally will decide if and when to request a
motorist to submit to a chemical test. However, in order to insure free-
dom from bias, the arresting law enforcement official is prohibited from
actually administering the test.22 Under the model statute only a licensed
physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed laboratory technologist or
clinical laboratory technician may withdraw blood from the subject.
Consequently, this problem will not arise if the test to be given is a
blood test. However, the urine, breath, and saliva tests may be con-
ducted by any person qualified to do so as prescribed by the state health
department. This could and should include a number of law enforce-
ment officials. 3 Forbidding the arresting officer to administer the test
in these three instances seems a small price to pay to insure the credi-
bility of the results and to obtain the confidence of the public.
(1967) (section 1194 gives the motorist the option to take a breath or urine test but no
notice of the option is provided for; also no notice of the right to refuse or of the
consequences of refusal).
21. See, e.g., State v. Corrigan, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 190, 228 A.2d 568 (1967); State v.
Bliss, -Del.-, 238 A.2d 848 (1968); People v. Mulack, 40 Ill. 2d 429, 240 N.E.2d 633
(1968); State v. Heisdorffer, -Iowa-, 164 N.W.2d 173 (1969); State v. Kenderski, 99
N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968); People v. Gielarowski, 58 Misc. 2d 832, 296 N.Y.S.2d
878 (1968); City of Columbus v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E2d 829, cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 941 (1967).
In Kenderski a breathalizer test was held not subject to the Miranda rule since
Miranda was based on the privilege against self-incrimination while the chemical test is
a search of the person and therefore subject only to the test of reasonableness.
For a short discussion of the constitutional applicability of Miranda to these types
of arrests see Comment, The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising in
a Criminal Proceeding, 74 Dicm. L. REv. 219, 237-39 (1970).
22. S. C. CODE As. § 46-344 (Supp. 1970).
23. Dimond, supra note 19, at 160. Michigan state police have set up a school to




(e) Time limit for administering tests.
The chemical tests provided for by this act shall be given within
two hours of the alleged violation. The evidence provided by the
chemical test shall indicate the alcoholic content of the motorist's
blood at the time of the alleged violation.
Several states have failed to provide a statutory time period beyond
which the chemical tests may not be administered.24 This failure pro-
motes laxity on the part of the police which often produces chemical
evidence of suspect credibility because the test was administered too
long after the time of the alleged violation. The model statute chooses'
a time period of two hours which begins to run at the time of the alleged
violation. The time of the alleged violation is chosen as the beginning
point of the time period because this is the time when the motorist's
condition is placed in question. The interests of the individual demand
that some reasonable limit be placed upon the time which the police'
may consume in administering these chemical tests. The two-hour
period, in line with a recent statute m seems to allow efficient law en-
forcement agencies ample time in which to conduct the specified tests.
Furthermore, the more abbreviated the time between the alleged viola-
tion and the administration of the chemical test, the more credibility may
attach to the test results.
Chemical tests provide information only as to the alcoholic content
of the subject's blood at the time the test is administered. Since this is
never the time at which the motorist's condition is in question, these
tests must be coupled with a reliable means of relating the results back
to the time of the alleged violation. This is accomplished by expert
testimony employing the mathematical process of extrapolation.20
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. AwN. § 322.261 (1968) (no statutory provision for time
limit in administering the test); VA. CODE ANN. § 1811-55.1 (Supp. 1970) (no statutory
provision for time limit in administering the test); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-5
(1970) (test must be administered two hours from the time of arrest or of acts
alleged).
25. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Supp. 1970) (test must be given within two hours
of the time of the alleged violation).
26. The courts generally have approved the admissibility of the expert's estimate
reached through the process of extrapolation. E.g., People v. Markham, 153 Cal. App.'
2d 260, 314 P.2d 217 (1957); Ray v. State, 233 Ind. 495, 120 N.E.2d 176 (1954); State
v. Baron, 98 N.H. 298, 99 A.2d 912 (1953). See Slough & Wilson, supra note 12, at 682-
83 for an explanation and discussion of the process of extrapolation:
Given a known rate of elimination of blood-alcohol in the average person,
an expert can reasonably estimate the percentage of the blood-alcohol in the
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(f) Motorist entitled to test; notice; admissibility of results.
Any person arrested for the commission of any offense while the
person allegedly was operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcoholic beverages is entitled to a chemical test for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood as
provided in this act and such person shall be advised accordingly.
The results of any test administered under this act shall be admis-
sible in any subsequent civil or criminal action to which the person
so tested is a party.
This provision of the model statute assures the motorist of the right
to a chemical test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content
of his blood should the arresting law enforcement official decide not to
conduct such a testy1 Thus, the motorist may not be denied valuable
evidence which may establish a presumption of non-intoxication at
trial.28 Many states do not have this provision in their implied consent
statutes. Often, states having a similar provision emasculate it by failing
to provide for proper notice to the arrested motorist of his right to a
chemical test,29 thus destroying the right. Such omissions make implied
consent statutes more oppressive than required to protect the public
interest. This provision is necessary to prevent arbitrariness on the part
of the law enforcement officials. Every effort must be made to insure
an individual the full protection of the law in order to justify the im-
position of an implied consent statute for the maintenance of public
safety.
(g) The unconscious motorist.
Any person who is incapable of refusing to submit to a chemical
test of his blood by reason of unconsciousness or other mental or
average person at the time of a certain event, based on the percentage of al-
cohol in the blood as shown in a chemical test. An expert witness may pro-
vide a reasonably accurate estimate of the blood-alcohol concentration of a
particular person if he is given definite facts from which he can determine
the rate of elimination taking place in the individual's body.
27. MicH. Comv. LAWS AN. § 257.625(a)(3) (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17C-5A-6 (1970).
28. "The blood test does as much to protect an innocent driver as it does to aid the
state in the prosecution of a guilty one." Marbut v. Comm'r, 194 Kan. 620, -, 400 P.2d
982, 984 (1965).
29. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-6 (Supp. 1970) fails to provide notice to the ar-
rested motorist of his right to demand a test. But see MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 257.675(a) (3) (Supp. 1970) where it is provided that the motorist ". . . shall be
informed that he has the right to demand that one of the tests provided for in para-
graph (1) shall be given him....
[Vol. 12:654+
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physical condition shall be deemed not to have 'withdrawn his con-
sent to a blood test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his blood. Such a test will only be administered under
a physician's care and authorization.
Many of the implied consent statutes currently in effect have no
provision which specifically authorizes a blood test to be performed
upon an unconscious person.3 In the absence of such a provision state
courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to the admissibility of
evidence based upon the results of chemical tests taken from unconscious
persons.31 The Supreme Court decision in Breithaupt v. Abram32 seems
to have foreclosed constitutional attack upon this procedure. However,
the specific statutory provision is necessary to insure proper interpre-
tation by the state's courts.ss
Only a blood test is provided in the case of the unconscious person
since any other test would present obvious difficulties of administration.
Although normally a registered nurse, or duly licensed laboratory tech-
nologist or clinical laboratory technician, would be qualified to give the
test, only a physician is qualified to administer the blood test to a person
who is unconscious. By making the doctor's discretion controlling, this
provision provides the extra care and precautions necessary when deal-
ing with a person who is possibly in a dangerous condition.
(h) Qualified consent; inability to take the breath test.
The law enforcement official shall treat any qualified assent by
the accused motorist as an absolute refusal to submit to a chemical
test. If, however, the motorist demonstrates his inability to take
the breath test due to the condition of his health, he must submit
30. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. Am. § 13-5-30 (1964) (no provision for an uncon-
scious person); CoNN. GEN. STAT. AiNx. § 14-227b (1970) (no provision for an uncon-
scious person); GA. CODE Am. § 68-1625.1 (Supp. 1970) (no provision for an uncon-
scious person).
31. A Vermont court in State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962) held that, in
spite of the implied consent statute, blood tests taken from those unconscious from
injury or drink are inadmissible in evidence in a driving while intoxicated prosecution
unless the respondent consents at some point either to the taking or to the admission of
the results.
32. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Court held that "the absence of a conscious consent,
without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional
right...." Id at 435.
83. For examples of specific provisions dealing with the unconscious motorist see AIA.
CODE tit. 36, § 154(b) (Supp. 1969); Amiz. Rxv. STAT. Am. § 28-691(c) (Supp. 1969-70);
IFLA. STAT. Am. § 322261(b) (1968).
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to any other test the la'w enforcement official selects. Refusal to
submit to the test so designated shall result in the suspension of
his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year.
Implied consent statutes which do not incorporate this provision place
the law enforcement official in a dilemma when the motorist's assent to
a chemical test is qualified (e.g., assent only if advised to do so by his
attorney). The official is forced to choose between treating the qualified
assent as a refusal to submit to the chemical test and complying with
the motorist's request, thus delaying the chemical test and jeopardizing
the validity of the results.34 The model statute treats a qualified assent
as an absolute refusal so that the law enforcement official may act with
confidence, secure in the knowledge that at trial the evidence of this
refusal will be admissible against the motorist.
A concession is made to the motorist who cannot take the breath
test due to medical reasons. If he demonstrates his inability to take the
breath test, the law enforcement official must provide another type of
chemical test. It is generally recognized that the breath test should
always be available to ameliorate the problem of the motorist who can
not submit to a blood test due to a heart or blood condition. However,
a motorist suffering from emphysema or some other lung disease might
have an equally valid medical reason precluding the use of a breath test.
The model statute seeks to accommodate these individuals by providing
an alternative chemical test.
(i) Admissibility of refusal as evidence.
The refusal of the accused motorist to submit to a chemical test
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood
as provided for by this act is admissible into evidence and may be
subject to comment in any subsequent civil or criminal action.
34. See State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J. Super. 1, 262 A.2d 41 (1970). Here the court held
that anything substantially short of an unqualified, unequivocal assent to an officer's
request that the arrested motorist take a test constitutes a refusal. Accord, Reirdon v.
Director, Dep't. of Motor Vehicles, 72 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1968). A motorist's statement to
an arresting officer that the motorist would take a chemical test to determine his
sobriety on the condition that his attorney be present at the taking of the test amounted
to a refusal for the purposes of California's implied consent statute. But see Thomas v.
Schaffner, 448 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. App. 1969). The driver, upon the officer's request to
take a breath test, informed him that he would rather have a blood test. Twenty min-
utes later he reconsidered and offered to take the breath test. The court held that the
driver did not unequivocally refuse to submit to a breath test and that his driver's
permit could not be revoked for refusal to submit to a breath test.
[Vol. 12:654
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There is little uniformity concerning the admissibility in evidence of
a motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test. Among those states
which have chosen to treat the problem directly by statute, the trend
seems to favor admissibility of such evidence.' Many implied consent
statutes are silent on this question, leaving the problem of admissibility
exclusively in the hands of the state courts.3 6 If such refusal were not
admissible, a motorist might effectively frustrate the purpose of the
statute by refusing the test and simply waiting out the one-year suspen-
sion of his driving privilege. This provision achieves the stated purpose
of an implied consent statute, implementing the public interest by re-
moving the drunken driver from the roads. By providing the prosecutor
with this additional weapon for use in obtaining convictions, some of the
advantage lost by permitting refusal under the statute is thereby regained.
(j) Arrest without a warrant.
A law enforcement official of this state may make an arrest at the
scene of any motor vehicle accident 'which did not occur in his
presence if upon personal investigation he has reasonable grounds
to believe that the person to be arrested has been operating a motor
vehicle 'while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
The crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages is a misdemeanor in most states. Consequently, for
an arrest without an arrest warrant to be valid, the offense must be com-
mitted in the presence of the law enforcement official.37 The model
implied consent statute requires a lawful arrest as a precondition to
administering a chemical test to a motorist. Therefore, if there is no
lawful arrest, the motorist's refusal to submit to a test will not result in
the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle. This problem
does not exist when the law enforcement official observed the motorist
speeding or driving recklessly. However, the law enforcement official
has not personally observed the violation when he arrives on the scene
of an accident after the fact. In this situation, absent the model statute
35. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 155(h) (Supp. 1969); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-
692(H) (Supp. 1969-70); LA. REv. STAT. § 32.666 (Supp. 1970). But see CoLo. REv. STAr.
ANN¢. § 13-5- 30(g) (1964); VA. CODE AN. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1970).
36. Compare State v. Holt, -Iowa-, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968) (refusal held admis-
sible) and State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) (refusal held admissible)
with State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599 (1961) (refusal not admissible).
37. E.g., Omo RFv. CODE ANN'. § 2935.03 (Page Supp. 1970) (person must be "found
violating" the law).
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provision, there can be no immediate arrest for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol even though the law enforcement
official may detect the odor of alcohol on the breath of one of the
drivers or notice the staggering manner in which he walks. The model
statute provision empowers the officer to make such an arrest and thus
require a chemical test of the person's blood. Several states have pro-
visions which specifically allow a police officer, without a warrant, to
arrest any person at the scene of an accident whom he has reasonable
grounds to believe was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcoholic beverages. Such provisions avoid not only the lengthy
delay which obtaining an arrest warrant would involve but also the
resulting detrimental effect the delay would have on the chemical test
results.
Most courts have liberally construed implied consent statutes in the
area of arrest without an arrest warrant.
Judicial determinations are almost uniform that even after an
accident, so long as the alleged violator has admitted that he was
the operator of the vehicle involved, the police have "found" the
motorist committting a misdemeanor within the meaning of the
legislative provision, thereby rendering legal an arrest without a
warrant.39
Since the validity of the arrest is fundamental to the application of the
implied consent statute, it should not be left to the discretion of the
courts; it should be provided specifically by the statute.
§ 101. Presumptions.
In any prosecution for any offense allegedly committed 'while
under the influence of alcoholic beverages the amount of alcohol
in the defendant's blood at the time of the alleged violation as
shovn by a chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, sa-
liva, or breath in accordance 'with this act shall be admissible into
evidence and shall give rise to the following presumptions:
38. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.443 (Supp. 1970); VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-100 (Supp. 1970).
39. Comment, Driving While Intoxicated-Implied Consent Statute in Ohio, 20 CAsE
W. Rrs. L. REv. 277, 293 (1968). The author supports his contention with the case of
State v. Williams, 98 Ohio App. 513, 130 N.E.2d 395 (1954), where the court stated that
the arresting officer need not have witnessed the defendant driving the car, and the
mere fact that he had been found in a state of intoxication was sufficient grounds upon
which to arrest him for driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
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(1) If there was at the time 0.05% or less by weight of alcohol in
the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was
not under the influence of alcoholic beverages;
(2) If there was at the time more than 0.05% but less than 0.10%
by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact shall not
give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or 'was not
under the influence of alcoholic beverages, but such fact may be
considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendant;
(3) If there was at the time 0.10% or more by 'weight of alcohol
in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant
was under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed
as requiring that evidence of the amount of alcohol in the de-
fendant's blood must be introduced, nor shall they be construed
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bear-
ing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under
the influence of alcoholic beverages. However, evidence of the
chemical test alone is sufficient and requires no corroboration.
Most earlier chemical test laws established the presumption that the
person was under the influence of alcohol if there was 0.15% or more
by weight of alcohol in his blood.40 The 0.15% level was originally
used to provide ample tolerance and assure legislative approval.41 How-
ever, today it is scientifically accepted that the normal individual suffers
significant impairment when there is 0.10% or more by weight of alco-
hol in the blood.4 The current trend is to employ the 0.10% or more
by weight of alcohol in the blood as the presumptive level for intoxica-
tion. 3 The danger to the public safety involved justifies a heavier burden
on the individual's interest. This consideration has prompted at least
one state governor to request the state legislature to lower the presump-
tive intoxication level from 0.15% to 0.10% in an effort to enhance the
40. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227 (a) (c) (1970); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-727.14
(1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1189 (1967) (amended in 1965 substituting the figure
"0.10" for "0.15").
41. Smith, supra note 2.
42. "The scientific conclusion has now been reached that the level is attained when
the percentage is only 0.10 and the revised Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-902(b) (3) (1962)
declares that the presumption shall come into operation at that figure." State v. John-
son, 42 N.J. 146, 153, 199 A.2d 809, 822 (1964).
43. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 28.35.033 (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262 (1968); S. C. CODE
ANN. § 46-344(b) (3) (Supp. 1970).
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effectiveness of the state's implied consent statute." The model statute
attempts to ameliorate the weight of this burden upon the individual by
providing that the presumptions based upon alcohol-blood percentages
shall be rebuttable.
§ 102. Persons qualified to administer the tests.
Only a licensed physician, registered nurse, or licensed labora-
tory technologist or clinical laboratory technician acting at the
request of a law enforcement official may withdraw blood for the
purpose of determining its alcoholic content. During such a test
some type of cleanser or sterilizer other than alcohol or other sub-
stance which might in any way affect the accuracy of the test shall
be used for the instruments and the part of the body from which
the blood is taken. Samples of urine, breath, and saliva shall be
taken in a reasonable manner by a person meeting the require-
ments of the State Health Department.
The model statute insures that elementary physical safety measures
will be afforded the motorist by prescribing the qualifications of indi-
viduals authorized to administer a blood test.4 The Supreme Court
recognized the necessity of such precautions in holding that there is
nothing "brutal" or "offensive" in the taking of a sample of blood when
done under the watchful eye of a physician. 4 One state has even seen
fit to limit those qualified to administer the blood test to licensed prac-
titioners of medicine and surgery.4 7 But such a requirement is unduly
burdensome in that it unreasonably restricts the number of administrants
available, and frustrates the successful operation of the statute.
In order to insure the validity of the test results, the model statute,
following the example of several states, has included a provision limit-
ing the type of disinfectant to be used in administering the test.4
The requirements for the urine, breath, and saliva tests are relaxed
44. Daily Press (Newport News, Va.), Sept. 10, 1970, at 55, col. 2.
45. E.g., TEXAs PEN. CODE art. 802f (Supp. 1969) (physician, qualified technician,
chemist, registered nurse, or licensed vocational nurse under the supervision or direc-
tion of a licensed physician); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55(b) (Supp. 1970) (physician,
registered nurse or graduate laboratory technician).
46. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 431, 435 (1957).
47. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227 (a) (1970).
48. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (Supp. 1970) (a sterilizer or cleanser other than
alcohol); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-2 (1968) (non-alcoholic antiseptic). The same
result has been reached by judicial determination in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People
v. Maxwell, 18 Misc. 2d 1004, 188 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Orange County Cr. 1959).
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somewhat leaving certification of those qualified to administer the tests
to the State Health Department. 49 These tests do not involve an actual
physical invasion of the body so that the risk of injury to the subject is
somewhat reduced. Consequently, the qualifications of those who may
administer them can be lowered making it more convenient for law
enforcement officers to reach qualified administrants.
(a) Immunity for a person qualified to -withdraw blood.
A qualified person who withdraws blood or assists in such 'with-
drawal in accordance with this act shall not be liable for any crime
or civil damages predicated on the act of withdrawing blood or
related procedures unless the 'withdrawal procedure is performed
in a negligent manner.
In order for a statute providing for a blood test determinative of the
alcoholic content of a person's blood to be effective, the law enforce-
ment agencies must have the complete cooperation of the medical pro-
fession and others qualified to administer such a test. In an attempt to
insure such cooperation, many states have included a provision preclud-
ing liability against the person assisting or actually withdrawing the
bloody ° Doctors and other qualified administrants in a state without an
immunity provision fear liability and hence often keep motorists wait-
ing for prolonged periods of time before administering the blood test.
Such inaction jeopardizes the credibility of the results of the test and
discourages the police officer from returning to this administrant. The
qualified administrant thus avoids potential personal liability simply by
evading the responsibility. An immunity provision would eliminate the
necessity of such conduct and insure close cooperation between the
medical profession and the law enforcement agency.
(b) Motorist's right to an additional test; notice.
The motorist tested may at his own expense 'within two hours
of the alleged violation have a qualified person of his o'wn choosing
administer a test in addition to the officially administered test.
The motorist shall be advised immediately upon arrest of this right
by the arresting officer.
49. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp. 1970) (breath and urine
specimens to be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of
health).
50. E.g., FLA. STAT. Amw. § 322.261(2) (e) (1968); MICH. CoMP. LAWS Am. §
257.625(a) (2) (Supp. 1970).
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This provision, standard in most implied consent statutes,51 is designed
to protect the motorist by providing a check on the results of the offi-
cially administered test. Wide discrepancies in the results of these tests
would seriously impeach the validity of the state's evidence. However,
the right is of little value to the accused motorist if he is not aware of
its existence. Therefore, several states have specifically provided for
the accused motorist to be informed of this right. 2
(c) Withdrawal procedure; availability of sample to motor-
ist.
If the test administered is a blood, saliva, or urine test the sample
shall be placed in each of two sealed containers. Upon completion
of the taking of the sample, the containers will be sealed in the
presence of the accused motorist after calling the fact to his atten-
tion. The containers shall be labelled and identified. The label will
contain the name of the accused, the date, and the time of the tak-
ing. One sample shall be delivered by the person who administered
the test to the law enforcement official for testing by the state as
approved by the State Health Department; and the other sample
shall be delivered to the person accused or his attorney. The ac-
cused may deliver the specimen to a laboratory supervised by a
pathologist or a laboratory approved by the State Health Depart-
ment as qualified to test such a specimen.
In addition to giving the motorist the right to have an additional test
administered by a person of his choosing, another safeguard is imple-
mented by providing the person tested with a sample of the specimen
withdrawn during the officially administered testZ3 This provides an
additional check on the test results and is compulsory under the statute.
Such provisions have not been widely adopted by the states. One reason
for the recalcitrance may be that the legislatures believe that the right
to an additional test is a sufficient check on the accuracy of the results.
However, when a state places so heavy a burden on the rights and inter-
ests of the individual, it owes those individuals the duty to provide every
safeguard reasonable under the circumstances.
51. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 28.35.033(e) (1970); ARlz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(f)
(Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE, ANN. § 46-344 (Supp. 1970).
52. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REv. StAT. ANN.
§ 262-A:69-c (1966); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2(d) (Supp. 1970).
53. This section is patterned after a similar provision in VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-
55.1 (dl) (Supp. 1966) (applied only to a blood sample).
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(d) Admissibility of results; availability of results to motorist.
The results of the chemical test are admissible in evidence in
any criminal or civil action 'within this state. The results of the
chemical test 'will be sent to the person tested or his attorney as
soon as possible.
The modern trend toward open discovery for the criminal defendant
has influenced most state legislatures to provide for the availability of
chemical test results and information concerning the test or tests given
upon request of the person tested.1 Few of the statutes, however, go
as far as the model statute by providing for automatic notice of the test
results.5 5 The model statute provision places little burden upon the
state; indeed, it manifests the concern of the state for the rights of the
individual.
§ 103. Refusal to submit; report of arresting officer; suspen-
sion of license; hearing.
If the operator of a motor vehicle, after being arrested for any
offense committed 'while allegedly operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of alcoholic beverages shall refuse to submit to a
chemical test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic con-
tent of his blood as provided for in this act 'when requested to do
so, none shall be given, but the arresting la'w enforcement official
shall deliver his s'worn report of such refusal to the Director of
Motor Vehicles. The report 'will specify the circumstances of the
arrest and the grounds upon 'which the official based his belief that
the person 'was operating a motor vehicle 'while under the influence
of alcohol. Upon receipt of such report, if the director shall find
that the arresting la'w enforcement official acted in accordance
'with the provisions of this act, he shall suspend the person's license
or permit to operate a motor vehicle, or if such person is a non-
resident, the privilege to operate a motor vehicle 'within this state,
or if the person is a resident 'without a license or permit to operate
a motor vehicle in this state, the director shall deny to the person
the issuance of a license or permit for a period of one year after
the date of the alleged violation. The director shall send the per-
54. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 2835.033 (f) (1970); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(G)
(Supp. 1969); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (B) (Supp. 1970). But see CoNe. GEN. STAT.
Aim. § 14-227a-b (1970) (no mention of availability of test results).
55. Two states which provide that the person be informed of his right to know the
test results are Maine and New Jersey. Ma. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1970);
N. J. STAT. A. § 39:4-50.2 (d) (Supp. 1970).
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son a notice of suspension containing a provision informing the
person of his right to a hearing on the suspension. If within
ten days of the date of suspension the person requests a hear-
ing before the director in writing it shall be granted. The di-
rector, upon such request, shall hold a hearing on the issues
of whether the law enforcement official had reasonable grounds
to believe the person had been driving while under the influence
of alcoholic beverages, whether the person was placed under law-
ful arrest, and whether the person refused to submit to the test
upon the request of the law enforcement official. If after such a
hearing the director finds in favor of the person on these issues
his license shall be re-issued. If after such a hearing the director
finds against the person on these issues the suspension of license is
final. Such suspension shall be independent of any revocation
or suspension imposed as a result of a subsequent conviction for
any offense allegedly committed while driving a motor vehicle
under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
Currently, every implied consent statute has a provision for an oppor-
tunity for the motorist to have a hearing before a state official of the
motor vehicle department concerning the suspension of his operator's
license due to his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood. How-
ever, there are several variations as to when the suspension shall become
effective.57 The model statute provision follows those jurisdictions which
impose suspension immediately upon receipt of the law enforcement
official's report. This procedure more effectively accomplishes the ob-
jective of removing the drunken driver from the road as soon as possible.
In light of the gravity of the possible consequences of allowing such
a driver to continue driving for any length of time, the public interest
must prevail.
56. New York's original implied consent statute was declared unconstitutional as a
denial of due process because, among other defects, it provided for the revocation of
a driver's license without a hearing. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
57. See ARK. STAT. AN. § 75-1045 (d) (Supp. 1969) (revocation after hearing); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 322.261(c) (1968) (no suspension to be effective until 10 days after
written notice to the motorist); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.444(1) (Supp. 1970) (immediate
revocation upon receipt of the officer's report by the director); S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-
344(d) (Supp. 1970) (suspension effective the day after the motorist receives written no-
tice unless he requests a hearing whereupon suspension does not become effective until the
day after the order sustaining his suspension is issued from the hearing); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 17C-5A-3 (1970) (suspension not effective until 10 days after the motorist receives
a copy of the order suspending his license).
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There is also a provision for the denial of a license or permit to any
resident without one who refuses to submit to a chemical test.58 Few
states have such a provision, without which these individuals may com-
pletely frustrate the statute since their refusal to submit to a chemical
test would go unpunished.
Another important aspect of this section deals with the notice to the
person of his right to a hearing on the matter of his suspended license.
Granting the motorist the right to a hearing is of very little significance
unless there are provisions requiring notice of this right to be given.
(a) Judicial review.
If the suspension or determination that there should be a denial
of issuance is sustained after a hearing, the person whose license or
permit to drive or n2on-resident operating privilege has been sus-
pended, or the person to whom a license or permit is denied under
the provisions of this section, shall have a right to file a petition
in the [ ] Court to review the final order of suspension
or denial.
This subsection goes one step further in protecting the rights of the
individual under the statute by providing for judicial review of the
circumstances surrounding the suspension of his privilege to operate a
motor vehicle. This provision guarantees the individual procedural due
process in determining if the suspension has been rightfully imposed.
CONCLUSION
Implied consent statutes have the possibility of providing the solution
to this nation's greatest highway menace-the drunken driver. This pos-
sibility alone justifies the imposition of a heavy burden on an individual's
rights and liberties in order to implement the overriding public interest.
States must be careful in drafting an implied consent statute, however,
that they do not lose sight of the fundamental rights of the individual.
The delicate balance between the interest of the public and the interest
of the individual must be maintained. A statute which provides for notice
to the accused motorist of all of his rights and privileges under the statute
and for a hearing concerning any penalty imposed strikes this balance
58. The provision providing for a denial of the issuance of a license or permit to a
resident without a license or permit is patterned after Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.44(1) (Supp.
1970).
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as nearly as is possible. This compromise encourages the cooperation of
the citizenry while insuring reliable test results. The overall effect can
be salutary and can be accomplished without losing sight of the purpose
of an implied consent statute.
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